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Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or
Deliberate Strategy?
Kristin E. Hickman*
In an interesting paradox, administrative law scholars have long debated
the extent to which their field really exists. On the one hand, we identify a
body of general principles—some statutory, some not—that we try to apply
consistently across a collection of administrative agencies. On the other
hand, we acknowledge that these myriad agencies often have little in
common beyond their connection with the federal government. Given the
diversity of organizational structures, practices, and goals among federal
government agencies, is there or should there be a body of general principles
labeled administrative law?
In 1960, Walter Gellhorn and Clark Byse concluded that administrative
law had evolved substantially from a focus almost exclusively upon
separation of powers and judicial review to one that increasingly emphasized
administrative procedure and organic statutes—in other words, from
generally applicable doctrines to potentially more variable procedures and
obviously more agency-specific statutes.1 In 1975, Ernest Gellhorn and Glen
O. Robinson recognized the continued splintering of administrative law as
courts and scholars struggled to maintain a collection of general principles
for agencies as diverse as the Federal Communications Commission, the
Food and Drug Administration, and the U.S. Forest Service.2 Yet,
administrative law scholars persisted and doggedly continued the effort, and
*

2010–11 Julius E. Davis Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you to
Mary Lou Fellows, Rob Glicksman, and Rick Levy for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. WALTER GELLHORN & CLARK BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS ix–x
(4th ed. 1960).
2. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 771, 783–84 (1975)

90

Texas Law Review See Also

[Vol. 89:1

still do, to bring order to chaos under the heading of administrative law. The
Supreme Court seems supportive of this effort, for example, by emphasizing
“the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of
administrative action.”3
Professors Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman recently published an
administrative law casebook that endeavors to teach basic administrative law
principles through the lens of only five agencies.4 In Agency-Specific
Precedents,5 Levy and Glicksman draw from that experience and, in some
sense, return to the old question of whether administrative law is a real field
of legal study and practice. They observe that judges evaluating agency
action tend to draw principally from prior cases concerning the same agency,
even when discussing more generally applicable administrative law
principles.6 As a result, judicial application of doctrines that ought to be
applied consistently across agencies instead varies meaningfully depending
upon the agency under review.7 Contra Gellhorn and Robinson, Levy and
Glicksman clearly believe that at least some of these deviations are
problematic.8 The question then becomes how to solve the problem.
Of course, to solve a problem, one generally must identify its cause.
Leaving aside deviations that are congressionally or statutorily mandated,
Levy and Glicksman theorize that agency-specific precedents arise in
substantial part from a “silo effect” caused by attorney specialization,9 a
refusal of attorneys to bear the costs of expanding their knowledge base
beyond their areas of specialty,10 and the inability of judges to compensate
for the resultant agency-specific briefing.11 This theory of rational ignorance
3. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 707 (2011)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
4. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION
IN LEGAL CONTEXT v (2010) (explaining reliance on the Environmental Protection Agency, the
National Labor Relations Board, the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service,
and the Federal Communications Commission to elucidate administrative law principles).
5. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 499
(2011).
6. Id. at 500.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 571–77.
9. Id. at 558–59.
10. See id. at 559 (describing attorney cost–benefit analysis).
11. Id. at 561–62. Levy and Glicksman acknowledge that some disparities between agencyspecific precedents and general administrative law norms derive from distinctive statutory
provisions or programmatic features. Id. at 572. Such deviations may be normatively troubling but
cannot be legally problematic. The Chevron and Skidmore standards of review are judicial policy,
not constitutional mandates; the Supreme Court can limit the scope of their applicability as it finds
good reasons to do so. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Congress enacted the procedural
requirements and standards of the Administrative Procedure Act and can alter that general scheme
as much as it likes in specific statutes; within constitutional limits, judges ought to respect the

2010]

Response

91

is entirely plausible. Regulatory lawyers in contemporary legal practice tend
to be highly specialized and are more likely to be familiar with and rely upon
cases in their specific areas of regulation, potentially ignoring nuances of
general administrative law doctrine developed in cases outside those areas.
Generalist judges necessarily depend heavily on the briefs prepared by those
specialist lawyers and, absent clear direction from the parties or their own
knowledge of administrative law,12 are liable to gloss over agency-specific
deviations in doctrinal evolution even as minor differences become major
ones. From my own anecdotal experience of delivering continuing education
lectures to tax attorneys regarding administrative law doctrine, the theory that
Levy and Glicksman advance is absolutely correct in many instances.
Against this backdrop of rational ignorance on the part of lawyers and
judges, Levy and Glicksman propose a solution that emphasizes practitioner
awareness of the problem,13 with special emphasis on the Office of the
Solicitor General as the “gatekeeper” for Supreme Court litigation,14 so that
all might be persuaded to emerge at least a little from their silos.
Yet, while Levy and Glicksman’s explanation is undoubtedly true in
some cases, they do not claim it as the whole story. Indeed, it cannot be.
Highly specialized attorneys may not track every doctrinal nuance in
administrative law, but particularly in an era of large law firms with multiple
specialties, the silos of specialization cannot possibly be so wholly
impermeable. Every agency-specific deviation from administrative law
doctrine presumably offers an advantage to one side in litigation while an
appeal to general norms would aid the other. The significant dollars at stake
in many regulatory cases generally inspire highly sophisticated and highpriced attorneys to scour the law in search of arguments supporting their
clients’ preferred outcomes.
While government lawyers may lack
comparable resources, they are equally smart and capable of creative and
aggressive lawyering in defending government policies. Finally, it is highly
unlikely that the Solicitor General’s office remains perpetually unaware that
agency-specific precedents might vary somewhat from general administrative
law norms. Rather, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least some of
choices of Congress. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 572–73. By contrast, given Supreme
Court admonitions in favor of uniformity in the application of administrative law norms, agencyspecific divergences that are solely the result of uneven precedential evolution are legally suspect,
even where some lawyers or judges might find them normatively desirable. See id. at 575–76
(observing same).
12. The judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit are
notorious for their comparative expertise in administrative law, which comprises a substantial
percentage of the cases before that court. E.g., John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit
Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376–77, 388–89 (2006). One wonders whether
that court’s heightened knowledge of administrative law results in fewer instances of agencyspecific deviations from administrative law norms.
13. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 577–79.
14. Id. at 577.
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these attorneys are aware of the differences between general and agencyspecific precedents yet decline to bring them to the attention of the courts.
Instead, one might theorize that deliberate strategy rather than rational
ignorance explains why attorneys in at least some cases ignore general
administrative law doctrine in favor of agency-specific precedents in
formulating their arguments.
For that matter, assuming that at some point general and agency-specific
precedents followed parallel tracks, we also have to ask how differences
between general and agency-specific norms evolve. One can imagine that
some divergences occur gradually, perhaps as a result of an awkward turn of
phrase that takes on a life of its own in later cases involving the same agency.
In other instances, one might anticipate a more sudden break, such as when
general doctrine takes a sharp turn and various areas of administrative law
are slow to align with the shift. Rational ignorance may apply in either case,
but so may deliberate strategy as clever attorneys utilize the precedents most
favorable to their clients’ positions. In short, deviations between agencyspecific precedents and general administrative law norms likely arise from
many sources and develop in multiple ways.
If the cause varies, then so must the solution. Unfortunately, discerning
the most likely explanation for any given deviation requires delving more
deeply into the nuances of individual areas of governmental regulation—
turning to the very specialists who contribute to the problem in the first
place. To illustrate the problem of agency-specific precedents, Levy and
Glicksman include among their many examples two from my own primary
field of tax law.15 Both concern the tax community’s (and thus the
judiciary’s) longstanding habit of labeling general authority Treasury
regulations as interpretative rules, even though the regulations are legally
binding and thus clearly legislative in general administrative law parlance.16
This terminological dissonance has generated tremendous confusion
regarding whether general authority Treasury regulations are subject to
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements for notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Separately, at least until a few weeks ago, many tax
practitioners and several courts, including the United States Tax Court,
insisted that the tax-specific National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United
States17 rather than the arguably more deferential Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. provided the appropriate standard

15. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 521 (stating that the IRS’s practice of labeling
certain regulations interpretive “raises two important issues for the courts: (1) the validity of some
IRS general authority regulations that have not been adopted using the procedures required by § 553
of the APA and (2) the appropriate standard of review of the substantive validity of those rules”).
16. Id. at 520.
17. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
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of review for legal interpretations advanced in general authority Treasury
regulations.
The tax bar is notoriously insular, lending support to Levy and
Glicksman’s theory of rational ignorance.18 Nevertheless, in this Response, I
argue that deliberate strategy, at least as much as rational ignorance, explains
the persistence of these particular tax-specific departures from administrative
law norms. In doing so, I will offer some of the history and context of Levy
and Glicksman’s tax-specific examples. But times are changing; attorneys in
some cases are arguing in favor of reuniting tax and administrative law
norms, and courts are listening. Thus, I will also highlight a few high-profile
tax cases that are presently moving tax in the direction of Levy and
Glicksman’s preferred end of administrative law uniformity. Part I will
discuss the history of Treasury regulation labeling. Part II will consider the
resulting confusion over the applicability of APA notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements to general authority Treasury regulations. Part III
will elaborate on the National Muffler kerfuffle.
I.

Labeling Treasury Regulations

Like many statutes, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) delegates
rulemaking authority using two types of delegation provisions: specific
authorizations, which are mandates to adopt regulations that resolve
particular, congressionally identified issues;19 and a more general grant of
power contained in IRC § 7805(a) to develop “all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement” of the tax laws.20 Tax practitioners, courts
(particularly the United States Tax Court), and scholars habitually label
Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to specific authority as
“legislative” and those issued under the general authority of IRC § 7805(a) as

18. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (“[T]ax law too often is mistakenly viewed by lawyers,
judges, and law professors as a self-contained body of law . . . . [T]his misperception has impaired
the development of tax law by shielding it from other areas of law that should inform the tax
debate.”); Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to
Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 183 (1996) (“Tax law tends to be
uninformed by other areas of law. This insularity has the unfortunate consequence of depriving tax
and other fields of cross-fertilization.”).
19. The paradigmatic example of a specific authority grant is I.R.C. § 1502, which gives the
Secretary the power to adopt whatever regulations he “deem[s] necessary” for affiliated corporate
groups to prepare and file consolidated income tax returns “in such manner as clearly to reflect”
their tax liabilities and “to prevent avoidance” of the same. I.R.C. § 1502 (2006). The New York
State Bar Association Tax Section has issued a report claiming and categorizing more than 550
specific authority delegations in the I.R.C. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Legislative
Grants of Regulatory Authority 2–6 (Nov. 3, 2006) [hereinafter NYSBA Report], available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1121Report.pdf.
20. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).

94

Texas Law Review See Also

[Vol. 89:1

“interpretative.”21 Yet, general authority Treasury regulations carry the same
legal force as the specific authority ones. Penalty provisions in the IRC
speak inclusively of compliance with tax rules and regulations.22 The
Treasury Department has consistently interpreted that phrase as including all
“temporary or final Treasury regulations issued under the [IRC].”23 General
administrative law doctrine holds that legally binding agency rules are
legislative for APA purposes.24 Given the legal force of general authority
Treasury regulations, routinely labeling them as interpretative rules
represents a departure from administrative law more generally.25
It is important to recognize, however, that the tax community’s
characterization of general authority Treasury regulations has its origins in
historical administrative law practice and doctrine. The IRC has included
grants of specific rulemaking authority since the Revenue Act of 1916,26 and
Congress enacted the predecessor to IRC § 7805(a) as part of the War
Revenue Act of 1917.27 The IRC is not the only regulatory statute containing
both specific and general authority grants. For at least a hundred years,
Congress has been enacting statutes that speak in terms of both specific and
general rulemaking authority. The Communications Act of 193428 and the

21. E.g., Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial
Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 728 (2004); NYSBA Report, supra note 19, at 10–11.
22. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2006) (penalizing taxpayers for “[n]egligence or disregard of
rules or regulations”); id. § 6694(b) (1)-(2) (2006) (penalizing tax return preparers for “any reckless
or intentional disregard of rules or regulations”).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(e) (as amended in 2009); Treas. Reg. 1.6662-3(b)(2) (as amended in
2003).
24. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) (describing legislative rules as
carrying “the ‘force and effect of law’”); Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995
F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (observing that legislative rules carry “the force of law” while
interpretative rules do not); Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2000) (describing legislative rules as “legally binding”).
25. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978–79 (7th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing the incongruity between the characteristics of general authority Treasury regulations
and the interpretative label assigned to them by the tax community).
26. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 5(a)(8), 6(a)(7), 12(a)(2), 12(b)(2),
39 Stat. 756, 759, 760, 768, 769 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(authorizing regulations providing reasonable depletion allowances for oil and gas wells and mines);
id. §§ 8(g), 13(d) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (authorizing regulations
establishing permissible accounting methods other than that of “actual receipts and disbursements”).
27. War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300 (1917) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71–77
(2000)); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Review,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1565 (2006) (“The War Revenue Act of 1917 . . . introduced the
predecessor to I.R.C. § 7805(a).”).
28. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 220, 48 Stat. 1064, 1078–80
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 220) (granting specific authority to the Federal
Communications Commission to impose uniform accounting rules for regulated parties); id. at §
4(i), 48 Stat. at 1068 (giving the Federal Communications Commission general authority to “make
such rules and regulations, . . . not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution
of its functions”).
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Securities Act of 193329 are both examples of statutes including general as
well as specific rulemaking provisions.
At the time Congress adopted the APA in 1946, the consensus view of
both tax and non-tax legal scholars and practitioners held that general
authority regulations and rules had to be nonbinding or the statutes under
which they were promulgated would be unconstitutional. In the preceding
decades, the Supreme Court had generally declined to characterize even
broad statutory extensions of rulemaking authority as unconstitutional
delegations of legislative power.30 Nevertheless, the Court’s invalidation of
congressional delegations of regulatory authority in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan31 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States32 showed that at
least some grants of rulemaking power were constitutionally problematic.33
In the 1940s, tax and non-tax scholars and practitioners agreed that narrow,
specific grants of rulemaking authority passed constitutional muster and that
the resulting “legislative” regulations or rules issued under such authority
could carry legal force.34 By contrast, scholars and practitioners believed

29. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 10(b)(4), 48 Stat. 74, 81 (authorizing the
SEC to promulgate rules and regulations classifying prospectuses and establishing form and content
requirements for each class); id. § 19(a), 48 Stat. at 85 (giving the SEC the power to “make, amend,
and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 514, 522–23 (1911) (upholding the
Forest Reserve Act’s delegation of power to the Secretary of Agriculture to protect national forests
and to impose criminal penalties for violating such regulations); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S.
470, 494 (1904) (upholding a statute delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to “fix
and establish uniform standards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas
imported into the United States”).
31. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
32. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
33. See id. at 541–42 (invalidating a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act because
it was “an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power”); Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 431–32,
432–33 (declaring another provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional under
the nondelegation doctrine). Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry are the only two cases in
which the Court has invalidated congressional delegations of power to executive officials or
independent agencies as unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 104 (5th ed. 2010).
34. See 1 F. TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUER, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 489, at 487–88
(1942) (recognizing that administrative rules arising from specific authority delegated by Congress
have the “force of law” and that the legal underpinnings of interpretive regulations are more
tenuous); Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM. L.
REV. 252, 259–60 (1940) (indicating that a legislative regulation “has the force and effect of law”
and that “[t]he constitutionality of delegations of legislative power of this kind has long since been
recognized”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative, Legislative, and
Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 929 (1948) (“Valid legislative rules have the same force and effect
as valid statutes . . . .”); Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1, 2
(1940) (“[L]egislative regulations prescribe what the law shall be and have the force and effect of
law . . . .”); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417–19 (1942)
(recognizing the legal force of specific authority regulations promulgated by order of the Federal
Communications Commission); Md. Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920)
(describing specific authority regulations as having “the force and effect of law”).
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that general rulemaking grants of the “necessary rules and regulations”
variety that authorized legally binding regulations would be constitutionally
problematic in light of the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence.35
Accordingly, “interpretative” regulations or rules issued under general
authority merely reflected agencies’ best guesses as to a statute’s meaning
and were not binding on regulated parties.36 Although Kenneth Culp Davis
observed that the theory was not always so easily applied in practice,37 the
tax community’s characterization of general authority Treasury regulations
as interpretative rules originated during this period and, at that time, was
completely consistent with general administrative law principles.
Beginning in the 1960s, however, the traditional understanding of
specific authority regulations as legislative and general authority regulations
as interpretative slowly started to break down. The 1960s and 1970s saw a
substantial rise of agency rulemaking, with agencies increasingly seeking to
achieve policy objectives through general authority regulations that they
treated as legally binding on regulated parties.38 As the incidence of agency
rulemaking increased, regulated parties brought more challenges against
agency rules for their failure to satisfy APA procedural requirements. By
that time, the nondelegation premise previously employed by legal scholars
and practitioners to deny general authority regulations legally binding effect
35. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 34, at 260 (indicating that “the courts have uniformly regarded
the general Treasury regulations as merely stating the Treasury Department’s construction of the
statute” because if the section under which the regulations are promulgated “were to be construed as
conferring on the Commissioner an unlimited power to make rules having the force and effect of
law, it would be a plainly unconstitutional delegation of power”); Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and
Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 556,
557 (1940) (clarifying that the “‘all needful rules and regulations’” language “does not invest
interpretative regulations with the force of law”).
36. See, e.g., VOM BAUER, supra note 34, § 489, at 488 (arguing that interpretive regulations
are “administrative guess[es] at a judicial question” that lack the force of law); Alvord, supra note
34, at 261 (stating that the Treasury Department’s construction of the statute “is not binding upon
taxpayers” and is “the Treasury’s guess as to what the law means”); Davis, supra note 34, at 929
(“Since interpretative rules theoretically do not embody new law but merely interpret previous law,
they are valid only if the reviewing court finds the interpretation a permissible one.”); Surrey, supra
note 35, at 557–58 (explaining that interpretative regulations are “no more than the Department’s
construction of the Revenue Act” and are only binding upon the IRS’s personnel).
37. Davis, supra note 34, at 932. Interestingly, Davis identified general authority Treasury
regulations interpreting a short and vague definition of gross income in the I.R.C. as one example of
practice blurring the theoretical distinction between legislative and interpretative rules. See id. at
933–34 (“That the regulations are intended to be merely interpretative along with the bulk of other
tax regulations seems beyond doubt. Yet they are clearly designed to make bold and abrupt changes
in the law.”).
38. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 25–26 (describing increases in agency rulemaking after
passage of new federal statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and in agency
policy making through rulemaking); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules
with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 549–70 (2002)
(chronicling successful efforts by the Federal Trade Commission, Federal Drug Administration, and
the National Labor Relations Board in the 1960s to “acquire[] legislative rulemaking powers that
Congress had not originally granted to them”).
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had ceased to be persuasive.39 Courts and legal scholars started to define
legislative and interpretative rules by what they do rather than by the source
of their authority.40
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the scope of the
APA’s interpretative rule exception; its characterizations of specific authority
regulations as legislative rules and general authority regulations as
interpretative rules were made in the context of statements regarding judicial
review and deference for agency interpretations of law. In the 1970s and
early 1980s, several opinions by the Court addressing deference to tax41 and
non-tax42 agency legal interpretations contained statements distinguishing
between specific and general authority. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Chevron brought that consistency to a halt with its discussion of implicit
delegations of rulemaking power43 and its determination that a general
authority regulation issued by the Environmental Protection Agency was
entitled to the level of deference previously afforded only to legislative
regulations.44 By eliminating the distinction between specific and general
39. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 150 (2d ed.
1978) (describing nondelegation as a failed legal doctrine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12 (1976) (opining that the nondelegation doctrine “can not be taken
literally”).
40. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 381, 390 (“[M]any courts have declared that [agency-chosen] labels are entitled to judicial
deference, but cannot be dispositive of the issue of the proper characterization of a rule.”); id. at 394
(remarking that “[t]he prevailing standard for distinguishing legislative and interpretive rules can be
described as the ‘legal effect’ test,” which considered whether the rule “makes ‘new law,’ as
opposed to merely interpreting ‘existing law’”); William T. Mayton, A Concept of a Rule and the
“Substantial Impact” Test in Rulemaking, 33 EMORY L.J. 889, 894–95, 896–99 (1984) (relating that
the substantial impact test, applied by some courts in lieu of the legal effects test, “look[s] to the
substance of an agency action that has created a rule”).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (indicating that
Treasury regulations issued under general rather than specific authority require less deference);
Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (“[W]e owe the interpretation [embodied in
a general authority Treasury Regulation] less deference than a regulation issued under a specific
grant of authority . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 & n.9 (1977) (counseling greater
deference in regulations issued pursuant to express congressional delegations than to interpretative
regulations); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 307–08 (1979) (denying legislative
effect to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under general authority, but leaving
open the possibility that some general authority grants would support legislative regulations).
43. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
44. At least, the consensus among administrative law scholars seems to be that the regulations
at issue in Chevron were adopted pursuant to general authority. See, e.g., John F. Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 113, 199–200 (1998)
(observing that the Solicitor General began his argument in the Chevron case by quoting in full the
Clean Air Act’s general authority provision); Merrill & Watts, supra note 38, at 473 (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s Chevron decision treated as legally binding a rule adopted by the [EPA] pursuant
to its general rulemaking powers under the Clean Air Act.”). The preamble to those regulations
cited four sections of the Clean Air Act, only one of which was the general authority provision.
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authority in judicial deference doctrine, the Chevron Court removed any
residual basis for preserving the same distinction in evaluating APA
procedural requirements.45
In short, the tax community’s habit of labeling specific authority
Treasury regulations as legislative rules and general authority Treasury
regulations as interpretative rules represents an instance of general
administrative law shifting direction while agency-specific understandings
maintain course. The consequences of this split have been substantial.
II. The Applicability of APA Rulemaking Requirements
In promulgating specific and general authority regulations, the Treasury
Department issues notices of proposed rulemaking and seeks public
comment.46 Nevertheless, because of the interpretative rule label, the
Treasury Department claims that its general authority regulations are exempt
from the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.47 It also
contends that most of its regulations are promulgated pursuant to general
authority.48 Hence, the preambles of virtually all contemporary Treasury
regulations contain a statement that APA procedural requirements do not

Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval and
Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766, 50,771 (Oct.14, 1981) (citing, inter
alia, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a) (1976)).
45. The Court’s opinion in Chevron was not the only case contributing to the demise of relying
on the source of a rule’s authority to ascertain its legal force. For example, Thomas Merrill and
Kathryn Watts assign a major role in that doctrinal evolution to Judge J. Skelly Wright’s earlier
opinion in National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See Merrill &
Watts, supra note 38, at 554–57 (summarizing Judge Wright’s opinion recognizing the power of the
Federal Trade Commission to issue legally binding rules under general authority, and describing it
as “short-lived” but as an invitation for “other agencies . . . to assert generalized legislative
rulemaking powers that Congress had not expressly granted”).
46. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.2.3(3) (2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm (“The Administrative Procedure Act . . . requires agencies to
publish Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs) in the Federal Register and permit the public to
submit comments.”); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack
of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1727, 1748–49 (2007) (documenting that the Treasury Department issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking seeking public comments in 221 of 232 regulation projects over a three-year period but
that, in many of those projects, it sought public comments only after promulgating temporary,
legally binding regulations).
47. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 46, § 32.1.2.3(3) (“Interpretative regulations are
generally not subject to the APA provisions on rulemaking, including its notice and comment
requirements. However, although most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative, the IRS usually
publishes its NPRMs in the Federal Register and solicits public comments.”); id. § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1(5)
(“Interpretative rules are not subject to the provisions of [the Administrative Procedure Act].
Although most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative, and therefore not subject to these
provisions of the APA, the IRS usually solicits public comment on all NPRMs.”).
48. See Hickman, supra note 46, at 1751 (observing that the Treasury Department cited I.R.C.
§ 7805 as authority on which it relied in all 232 of the regulation projects studied).
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apply,49 and a substantial number of Treasury regulations present fairly
straightforward APA compliance problems.50
The question remains, however, why tax law has failed to follow the
rest of administrative law in its trajectory away from the specific versus
general authority dichotomy. As Levy and Glicksman observe, few
contemporary tax cases actually address the applicability of APA procedural
requirements to Treasury regulations.51 In fact, while taxpayers routinely
challenge the validity of Treasury regulations in court, they rarely raise
claims of APA procedural violations. It is unlikely that any theory can fully
explain this failure to seek judicial review of the Treasury Department’s
procedural failings. Rational ignorance is certainly a contributing factor.
Nevertheless, a few tax-specific statutory and doctrinal limitations on preenforcement judicial review in the tax context substantially reduce the
strategic value of bringing APA procedural claims at all.
Since Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,52 general administrative law
doctrine has read the APA’s judicial review provisions as adopting a
presumption in favor of pre-enforcement judicial review of legislative rules.53
In the tax context, however, the IRC includes a section known as the AntiInjunction Act providing that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person.”54 Correspondingly, the Declaratory Judgment Act contains a tax
exception that prevents courts from providing declaratory relief for
controversies “with respect to Federal taxes.”55 In a series of cases in the
1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court interpreted these provisions as
precluding judicial review of virtually all tax cases until either the IRS had
issued a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer or a taxpayer had been denied a
refund by the IRS.56 Although the Court has never interpreted either the
49. See id. at 1749–50 (documenting that the Treasury Department routinely includes
statements in its regulatory preambles disclaiming the applicability of APA procedural
requirements).
50. See id. at 1748 (explaining that 40.9% of Treasury regulations in the study presented APA
compliance problems under existing administrative law norms).
51. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 522–23.
52. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
53. See id. at 140 (stating that the APA “embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to
one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action’”).
54. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 8, 12 (1974) (per curiam)
(holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred conscientious objectors from suing to enjoin the
withholding of taxes from their wages, even though they claimed such withholding deprived them
of their First Amendment rights); Alexander v. “Ams. United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 756–57, 763
(1974) (prohibiting a nonprofit from seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the
reinstatement of its tax-exempt status on the basis that the IRS’s administration of IRC provisions
was erroneous or unconstitutional); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 727, 735–36 (1974)
(forbidding a university from suing to prevent revocation of its tax-exempt status, even though it
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Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act as precluding preenforcement judicial review of APA procedural challenges against Treasury
regulations, a few lower courts have interpreted its precedents as requiring
that conclusion.57 Regardless, standing represents a substantial obstacle to
pre-enforcement judicial review for taxpayers in many if not most cases.
Some Treasury regulations impact a given taxpayer’s liability or reporting
requirements on an immediate and recurring basis. But many if not most
Treasury regulations are highly situational, such that any single taxpayer
might only confront them once in a lifetime. Alternatively, a Treasury
regulation may be sufficiently ambiguous in its own right that a taxpayer
would prefer to adopt the plausible-but-favorable interpretation and chance
an audit rather than conceding the more-likely-but-unfavorable approach that
would enable the taxpayer to assert the injury in fact necessary to establish
standing.58
Against this backdrop, most taxpayers are faced with two options:
deliberately disobeying a Treasury regulation and facing potential penalties
for doing so, or paying taxes that they believe are not owed and seeking a
refund solely for the purpose of challenging the regulation. For a taxpayer
facing third-party reporting requirements that do not affect its own tax
liability as a result of a Treasury regulation, disobedience is the only option.
A taxpayer that disagrees with a Treasury regulation can avoid penalties by
disclosing its noncompliance with its tax return,59 but such a taxpayer thus
claimed the revocation would cause it to suffer “irreparable injury” and would violate its
constitutional rights); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1962)
(concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred a corporation from suing to enjoin the collection of
taxes, even when payment of such taxes allegedly would bankrupt the corporation).
57. See e.g., Stephenson v. Brady, 927 F.2d 596, 1991 WL 22835, at *2, *4–5 (4th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act and AntiInjunction Act precluded taxpayer from challenging regulation and related annual informational
return forms on APA procedural grounds); Reimer v. United States, 919 F.2d 145, 1990 WL
186825, at *1–3 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table decision) (affirming dismissal of taxpayers’
request for declaratory and injunctive relief against an IRS tax claim on APA grounds under the
Declaratory Judgment Act and Anti-Injunction Act); cf. Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d
1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (reading the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act as
statutory limitations on pre-enforcement judicial review in the tax context, notwithstanding the APA
presumption in favor thereof). But see E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1285–
86 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (concluding before vacatur that the AntiInjunction Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the APA do not operate to preclude judicial
review of all pre-enforcement tax claims—an issue not reached in the Supreme Court’s decision to
vacate).
58. Audit rates for most taxpayers are strikingly low. For example, in 2006, fewer than one
percent of all income tax returns were audited by the IRS. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2007-30-056, TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR
2006, at 8 (2007) (explaining that 1,283,950 (1 in 103) individual income tax returns were examined
in fiscal year 2006). The audit rate for corporate returns was slightly higher at 1.25%. See id. at 9–
10 (indicating that 28,427 (1 in 80) corporate income tax returns were examined in fiscal year
2006).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c) (as amended in 2003).
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exposes itself to a more comprehensive IRS audit. For these reasons, a
Treasury regulation may be on the books for years or even decades before a
naturally-occurring deficiency or refund action arises to challenge its
validity. Furthermore, the Treasury Department’s most frequent procedural
failing is its promulgation of legally binding temporary regulations with only
post-promulgation notice and comment and without a contemporaneous
assertion of good cause. By the time a taxpayer is able to challenge a
temporary regulation in a deficiency or refund action, the Treasury
Department has usually finalized the regulation or can quickly do so if
challenged on that basis. General administrative law doctrine is unclear as to
whether post-promulgation notice and comment can “cure” a procedurally
flawed temporary regulation.60
In sum, given all of these legal and practical obstacles to raising APA
procedural challenges, most taxpayers simply comply with and complain
about questionable Treasury regulations. When taxpayers nevertheless find
their positions challenged by the IRS, taxpayer representatives reasonably
conclude that procedural claims are quixotic and choose instead to focus
solely on substantive challenges.
Two litigation events, however—one a series of appeals pending before
several federal circuit courts, the other an en banc rehearing before the D.C.
Circuit—may alter this landscape. In both, taxpayers are challenging actions
by the Treasury Department and the IRS for their noncompliance with APA
rulemaking procedures. Yet, the background of these cases makes clear that
the taxpayers have raised the APA procedural challenges as a last resort
rather than as first-choice litigating positions.
The tax world currently is abuzz over a series of federal circuit court
appeals challenging the validity of Treasury Regulation § 301.6501(e)-1 on
both substantive and APA procedural grounds. This general authority
regulation broadens the applicability of a provision extending the limitations
period for assessing tax deficiencies from three to six years in certain cases.61
The Treasury Department initially issued the regulation in temporary but

60. Compare, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 379–80 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding final regulations invalid due to procedural failings of interim-final regulations),
vacated, 498 U.S. 1077 (1991), vacating as moot, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 767–68 (3d Cir. 1982) (rejecting post-promulgation notice
and comment as inadequate and invalidating regulatory amendments so adopted), with Fed. Express
Corp. v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 112, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding post-promulgation opportunity for
comment sufficient), and Levesque v. Bloc, 723 F.2d 175, 188 (1st Cir. 1983) (“When the response
suggests that the agency has been open-minded, the presumption against a late comment period can
be overcome and a rule upheld.”). For an acknowledgment of the difficulty in fashioning a remedy
under such circumstances, see Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1203–05 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
61. See I.R.C. § 6501(a), (e) (2006) (setting the limitations period at three years for assessing
most tax deficiencies but at six years where the taxpayer omits from gross income amounts that are
properly includible); Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1T(a) (2009) (interpreting IRC § 6501 omissions to
include basis overstatement).
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legally binding form—without a contemporaneous assertion of good cause
and only post-promulgation notice and comment—in the midst of litigation
over a popular tax shelter transaction known as Son-of-BOSS that was
executed by a number of taxpayers.62 The United States Tax Court rejected
the temporary regulation as inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
relevant statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court fifty years ago,63 but two
concurring judges would have invalidated the regulation instead for failing to
comply with APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.64 The
Treasury Department has since finalized the regulation with only minimal
changes.65 Because Tax Court decisions are appealable to the taxpayer’s
home circuit, and the government is simultaneously pursuing similar cases
against several taxpayers, appeals of the Tax Court’s decision are currently
pending before several circuits.66 As they did before the Tax Court, in each
of these cases, parties and amici have continued to argue that the regulation
is a legislative rule and that the Treasury Department’s failure to pursue prepromulgation notice and comment renders the regulation procedurally invalid
under the APA.67 Given the number of circuits considering these issues, and
the perceived inevitability of a circuit split, the Supreme Court will likely be
petitioned to resolve the matter.
In an unrelated case, Cohen v. United States,68 taxpayers have
challenged the validity of Notice 2006-50, a comparatively informal IRS
pronouncement, for its lack of APA notice-and-comment procedures.69
While the government claims that Notice 2006-50 was both exempt from

62. See T.D. 9466, 74 Fed. Reg. 49321, 2009-43 I.R.B. 551 (2009) (setting forth “temporary
regulations . . . defining an omission from gross income for purposes of the six-year minimum
period for assessment of tax attributable to partnership items and the six-year period for assessing
tax”); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2009-43 C.B. 557 (2009) (cross-referencing T.D. 9466 and
requesting public comments).
63. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. No. 11, 2010 WL 1838297, at
*7–8 (T.C. May 6, 2010).
64. Id. at *17–22 (Halpern & Holmes, J.J., concurring).
65. See T.D. 9511, 75 Fed. Reg. 78897, 2011-6 I.R.B. 455 (2010) (setting forth “final
regulations defining an omission from gross income for purposes of the six-year minimum period
for assessment of tax attributable to partnership items and the six-year period for assessing tax”).
66. See alanhorowitz, Son-of-BOSS Statute of Limitations Issue Inundates the Courts of
Appeals, TAX APP. BLOG (Nov. 30, 2010), http://appellatetax.com/2010/11/30/son-of-boss-statuteof-limitations-issue-inundates-the-courts-of-appeals/ (summarizing the status of challenges before
seven circuit courts of appeals).
67. E.g., Brief of Appellees at 43–52, Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 2011 WL 832915
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2011) (No. 2008-5090), 2010 WL 2968050; Brief of Amicus Curiae Bausch &
Lomb Inc. in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 7–12, Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm’r (10th
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-9015), 2010 WL 2397311; Brief of Amicus Curiae Bausch & Lomb Inc. in
Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 10–14, Comm’r v. M.I.T.A. Partners (5th Cir. 2010) (No.
09-60827), 2010 WL 5162780 (consolidated with Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.
2011).
68. 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 599 F.3d 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
69. 578 F.3d at 16 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part).
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notice-and-comment rulemaking and nonjusticiable as a nonbinding policy
statement,70 a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit applied general
administrative law doctrine to conclude that the Notice was in fact a
legislative rule and final agency action because it affected the legal rights and
obligations of taxpayers and reflected the IRS’s intention to bind itself to a
particular legal position.71 The court subsequently granted the government’s
petition for rehearing en banc and asked the parties to brief several questions
regarding the proper interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act, the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and the APA.72 The IRS action at issue in Cohen
is not a Treasury regulation, and the panel majority’s analysis did not address
whether general authority Treasury regulations are legislative or
interpretative. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reconcile the panel’s evaluation
of the Notice’s legal force with any conclusion but that general authority
Treasury regulations are legislative rules as well. Moreover, the en banc
court’s willingness to consider thoroughly the relationship between the APA,
the Anti-Injunction Act, and the Declaratory Judgment Act could have
substantial ramifications for the availability of pre-enforcement judicial
review of APA procedural challenges against Treasury regulations.
In these litigations, however, it is apparent that the taxpayers are
challenging Treasury regulations on APA procedural grounds not because
they have suddenly discovered administrative law doctrine but because the
strategic landscape has changed. Several courts have already adjudicated the
merits of the Son-of-BOSS tax shelter, and the government has prevailed
overwhelmingly.73 The government is no longer willing to settle any of
those cases. The only way that the taxpayers in the pending cases can avoid
paying millions of dollars of back taxes is to invalidate the Treasury
Department’s extension of the statute of limitations. In short, the usual
strategic considerations in tax cases no longer apply to these taxpayers; they
have run out of other options and have nothing to lose and everything to gain
by pursuing an APA procedural challenge. Likewise, the Cohen litigation
possesses an unusual posture. The taxpayers are not seeking ordinary preenforcement judicial review; they have paid their taxes.74 The case
originated as a class action contesting the IRS’s continued imposition of a
70. See id. at 3 (majority opinion) (“Now the IRS seeks to avoid judicial review by insisting the
notice it issued, acknowledging its error and announcing the refund process, is not a binding rule but
only a general policy statement.”).
71. Id. at 6–9.
72. Cohen v. United States, 599 F.3d 652, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
73. E.g., Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d 1249, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010); Jade Trading, L.L.C. v.
United States, 598 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527
F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2008); Fidelity Int’1 Currency Advisor A Fund, L.L.C. v. United States,
Nos. 05-40151-FDS, 06-40130-FDS, 06-40243-FDS, 06-40244-FDS, 2010 WL 4116469, at *1 (D.
Mass. Oct. 18, 2010); Colm Producer, Inc. v. United States, 460 F. Supp.2d 713, 713–14 (N.D. Tex.
2006).
74. See Cohen, 578 F.3d at 3 (identifying the appellant’s claim for a tax refund).
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telephone excise tax collected from telephone users by their service
providers.75 When the IRS had lost the same issue in several circuits,
acquiesced to the taxpayers’ position, and issued Notice 2006-50 to provide
taxpayers with a streamlined means for seeking refunds, the Cohen taxpayers
contended that the IRS’s refund mechanism was inadequate for their
circumstances and challenged the notice.76 In other words, the usual reasons
for complying with even questionable Treasury regulations to avoid
controversy with the IRS and uncertainty in the doctrine surrounding judicial
review of tax cases simply do not apply to the Cohen plaintiffs. They had no
reason not to bring the APA procedural claim, so they did. As for
government attorneys in these cases, they are actively and aggressively
defending both the Treasury Department and IRS actions in question and,
thus, the tax status quo. They show absolutely no indication that they are at
all interested in reconciling tax practice and jurisprudence with general
administrative law norms. If and when it confronts the inevitable petitions
for certiorari in these cases, the Solicitor General’s office is unlikely to
reverse course.
III. The Rise and Fall of National Muffler
As noted above, in the years leading up to its decision in Chevron,
consistent with decades of precedent, the Court defined the level of deference
due to an agency’s legal interpretations by reference to whether the agency
promulgated the regulations at issue under specific or general rulemaking
authority.
Legislative regulations promulgated pursuant to express
congressional command warranted strong, mandatory deference;77
interpretative rules issued under general rulemaking authority grants were
entitled only to what we now call Skidmore deference—a certain respect that
varies depending upon the relative presence or absence of several factors like
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors

75. Id. at 16 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
77. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (indicating that because the
regulation was promulgated under an “explicit delegation of substantive authority,” the Court would
undertake only a limited review); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425–26 (1977) (stating that
because Congress expressly delegated power to the Secretary to prescribe the standards at issue,
“Congress entrust[ed] to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for
interpreting the statutory term”); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471,
474 (1937) (“The regulation having been made by the commission in pursuance of constitutional
statutory authority, it has the same force as though prescribed in terms by the statute.”); Am. Tel. &
Tel. Corp. v. United States, 299 US. 232, 236–37 (1936) (“This court is not at liberty to substitute
its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their
administrative powers.”).
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which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”78 In 1979, in
National Muffler, the Court considered a challenge to a general authority
Treasury regulation. In upholding the regulation’s validity, the Court
justified deference to Treasury regulations generally based on Congress’s
delegation of rulemaking authority, Treasury’s expertise in the field, and the
need for consistent treatment of taxpayers.79 The Court articulated the
following standard as governing its review:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the
congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin,
and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a
substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation
dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits
inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency
of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny
Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent reenactments of the statute.80
The National Muffler Court’s emphasis on delegation and “serious
deference” toward reasonable regulations foreshadowed its later opinion in
Chevron.81 At the same time, National Muffler closely resembles the
multifactor inquiry of the Skidmore standard by which the Court at that time
typically evaluated general authority regulations.82 A few years later, but
still before deciding Chevron, in Rowan Cos. v. United States,83 the Court
again reiterated the significance of the distinction between specific and
78. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) (“We agree that the
thoroughness, validity, and consistency of an agency’s reasoning are factors that bear upon the
amount of deference to be given an agency’s ruling.”); Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425 n.9 (“Varying
degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the
timing and consistency of the agency’s position, and the nature of its expertise.”). Other factors
typically associated with Skidmore review include formality, longevity, contemporaneity, and
agency expertise. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 973–74 (1992) (describing and categorizing various factors associated with
Skidmore and like cases); David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference:
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 332–35 (1979) (summarizing factors
considered by courts in evaluating the degree of appropriate deference prior to Chevron).
79. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (summarizing
considerations).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 484.
82. Indeed, prior to deciding National Muffler, the Court on some occasions cited Skidmore as
the appropriate standard for evaluating general authority Treasury regulations. E.g., United States
v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 127 & n.11 (1963) (giving deference under Skidmore to a general authority
Treasury regulation).
83. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
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general authority, citing National Muffler and non-tax precedents that
supported Skidmore review for general authority regulations.84
The Court’s decision in Chevron, five years after National Muffler, is
considered revolutionary for its pronouncements regarding judicial review of
regulations promulgated pursuant to implicit in addition to delegated
rulemaking authority. Yet, Chevron was not a tax case, and the decision’s
significance for administrative law was not immediately apparent. Rather,
the pervasiveness of the strong form of Chevron deference developed
gradually, with some areas of the law (including, but not limited to, tax law)
slow to feel its influence. Tax law has certainly been on the tail end of the
Chevron revolution,85 but the courts’ reliance on National Muffler rather than
Chevron in reviewing general authority Treasury regulations has been
anything but monolithic.
In the 1990s, disagreement among the circuit courts of appeal emerged
over the relevance of the Chevron standard for judicial review of general
authority Treasury regulations. At least one circuit—the Sixth—declared
outright that Chevron rather than a less deferential National Muffler provided
the appropriate standard for evaluating general authority Treasury
regulations.86 Some circuit courts, along with the United States Tax Court,
agreed that National Muffler required a lesser degree of deference than
Chevron but believed that the former controlled judicial review of general
authority Treasury regulations.87 Still other circuit courts decided that
Chevron and National Muffler were indistinguishable.88 Confusing the issue
further, some courts cited both Chevron and National Muffler as supporting

84. Id. at 253 (citing National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477, and Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,
424–25 & nn.8–9 (1977)).
85. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX
REV. 51, 54 (1996) (“Chevron has been cited in tax cases only since 1989 and by the Tax Court
only since 1992.”).
86. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Sidney v. Comm’r, 948 F.2d 289, 304–05 (6th Cir.
1991).
87. See, e.g., Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (indicating that legislative
regulations, governed by Chevron, should be given “controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” and that interpretive regulations, governed by
National Muffler, “should be upheld if they implement the congressional mandate in a reasonable
manner”); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 911 F.2d 1128, 1137–38 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that
specific authority Treasury regulations should be given “controlling weight” and “more weight”
than general authority Treasury regulations, and citing Chevron for the former and National Muffler
in connection with the latter); see also Schuler Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d 753, 754–55
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing National Muffler and Chevron while advocating less deference for general
authority Treasury regulations).
88. See, e.g., St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 1394, 1400 n.11 (8th Cir. 1994) (“We
believe that the standard enunciated in National Muffler for reviewing such interpretive regulations
is consistent with the standard enunciated in Chevron.”). But see Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United
States, 142 F.3d 973, 978–83 (7th Cir. 1998) (remarking that while the National Muffler “deference
test walks like Chevron and talks like Chevron,” “there are some important differences” between
the tests).
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deference to reasonable Treasury regulations, even as they seemingly applied
one standard or the other.89
The Supreme Court contributed to the confusion with its own
inconsistency. In 1985, in United States v. Boyle,90 the Court rejected a
taxpayer’s challenge to the validity of a general authority Treasury regulation
and stated expressly that the regulation was entitled to deference under
Chevron.91 Then, in 1991, in Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner,92 the
Court clearly cited and applied National Muffler’s multiple factors in
evaluating a general authority Treasury regulation.93 In 1992, in United
States v. Burke,94 the Court’s majority resolved the case without employing
either standard, but Justice Scalia writing in concurrence cited and applied
Chevron in concluding that the IRS’s interpretation of the statute was
unreasonable.95 Nevertheless, in 1997, in Commissioner v. Estate of
Hubert,96 Justice Scalia writing in dissent cited National Muffler as
supporting judicial deference to a general authority Treasury regulation that
he described as a “reasonable interpretation of” the statute.97 In 1998, in
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner,98 Justice Scalia writing for a
unanimous Court cited and clearly applied Chevron’s two steps in deferring
to a Treasury regulation99 that both parties described on brief as
“interpretive.”100 Finally, in 2003, in Boeing Co. v. United States,101 the
Court cited Cottage Savings—which, recall, employed the National Muffler

89. See, e.g., Redlark v. Comm’r, 141 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Chevron and
National Muffler for the proposition that “the fact that the reasonable construction that an agency
adopts in interpreting an ambiguous statute is inconsistent with past interpretations or the past
practice of the agency does not without more call into question the propriety or the reasonableness
of the new construction”); Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 1404, 1408 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing
National Muffler and Chevron as indicating that “[c]ourts customarily defer to a treasury regulation
that implements the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner”); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
United States, 955 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1992) (indicating that Chevron and National Muffler
mandate the court to “defer to a regulation that implements a Congressional mandate in a reasonable
manner”).
90. 469 U.S. 241 (1985).
91. Id. at 246 n.4.
92. 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
93. Id. at 560–62.
94. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
95. Id. at 242 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. 520 U.S. 93 (1997).
97. Id. at 127–28, 138 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. 523 U.S. 382 (1998).
99. Id. at 389–91.
100. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382 (1994) (No. 97147), 1997 WL 748712; Brief for the Respondent at 4, 20, 21, Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r,
523 U.S. 382 (1998) (No. 97-147), 1998 WL 3221.
101. 537 U.S. 437 (2003).

108

Texas Law Review See Also

[Vol. 89:1

standard—as supporting deference toward a Treasury regulation it identified
as issued under general authority.102
In accord with Levy and Glicksman’s rational ignorance theory, the
Court’s inconsistency can be traced to the parties’ failure to bring the
question of Chevron versus National Muffler to its attention. In Boyle and
Boeing, the taxpayers’ briefs cited National Muffler,103 and in Atlantic
Mutual Insurance, they noted without question the Third Circuit’s reliance
on Chevron.104 The rest were silent regarding the standard of review. The
government’s brief in Boeing claimed Chevron deference.105 But its briefs in
Atlantic Mutual Insurance and Cottage Savings cite Chevron and National
Muffler as supporting deference to reasonable regulations generally;106 its
brief in Estate of Hubert cited Skidmore along with National Muffler;107 its
brief in Burke cited only National Muffler and its progeny, Cottage
Savings.108 In short, at least before the Supreme Court, neither taxpayers nor
the government have consistently advocated for National Muffler or Chevron
as the standard for judicial evaluation of general authority Treasury
regulations. The briefs in Boeing hinted at the issue, with taxpayers citing
National Muffler and the government claiming Chevron deference, but those
documents neither recognized that the standards might conflict nor
acknowledged the circuit split. Until the present term, no tax case before the
Supreme Court offered anything remotely approximating clear briefing of the
Chevron versus National Muffler issue with regard to general authority
Treasury regulations. Hence, National Muffler continued to play a starring
role in many lower court cases examining the substantive validity of general
authority Treasury regulations.109
Law review articles in the late 1990s documented and debated the
uncertainty surrounding the relationship between National Muffler and
102. Id. at 448.
103. Brief for the Petitioners at 22–23, Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2002) (No.
01-1209), 2002 WL 1886160; Brief of Respondent at 19, United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241
(1984) (No. 83-1266), 1984 WL 565869.
104. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 100, at 13–14.
105. Brief for the United States at 20–21, Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2002)
(Nos. 01-1209, 01-1382), 2002 WL 31557669.
106. Brief for the Respondent at 7, 14–15, 19, Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554
(1990) (No. 89-1965), 1990 WL 10012939; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 100, at 7–8, 16–
17.
107. Brief for the Petitioner at 33–34, Comm’r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93 (1996) (No. 951402), 1996 WL 325327.
108. Brief for the United States at 19–20, United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1991) (No. 9142), 1992 WL 526129.
109. See, e.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 172–82 (2006) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (documenting the circuit split and summarizing differences between Chevron and
National Muffler); Hickman, supra note 27, at 1556–63 (reviewing the status of the circuit split and
broader tax community disagreement over National Muffler’s continued role in judicial review of
general authority Treasury regulations).

2010]

Response

109

Chevron.110 After the Supreme Court offered additional guidance regarding
the scope of Chevron’s applicability in United States v. Mead Corp.,111 the
question of judicial deference for general authority Treasury regulations
received even greater attention in the tax community. In 2004, an ABA
Section on Taxation Task Force on Judicial Deference issued a report
advocating a variant of Chevron review incorporating National Muffler
factors for general authority Treasury regulations.112 Law professors and tax
practitioners wrote articles debating the issue.113 A couple of circuit courts
shifted toward Chevron review for general authority Treasury regulations,114
while the Tax Court continued to assert its preference for the National
Muffler standard.115 Finally, the current term brought the issue before the
Supreme Court. In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v.
United States,116 the Court was confronted with a challenge to the validity of
a general authority Treasury regulation.117 Briefs filed by the parties and by
dueling amicus briefs thoroughly articulated the continued disagreement
among the lower courts and the competing doctrinal options.118 In an opinion

110. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 85, at 75–81 (reviewing the inconsistency with which courts
applied Chevron and National Muffler); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and
Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 57–63 (1995) (explaining that
because the Supreme Court had not provided lower courts clear guidance on Chevron’s
applicability, both Chevron and National Muffler were cited).
111. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
112. Salem et al., supra note 21, at 737–44. Professor Ellen Aprill, a member of the task force,
made a similar pre-Mead suggestion of combining the Chevron and National Muffler standards.
Aprill, supra note 85, at 81–84.
113. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury
Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 81–83 (2003) (chronicling the
inconsistent treatment of Revenue Rulings by the courts); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End
of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 792–93 (2002) (advocating the framework of
Skidmore instead of Chevron for both interpretive and legislative regulations); Hickman, supra note
27, at 1541–42 (explaining “why the more straightforward conclusion of Chevron deference [rather
than National Muffler deference] for Treasury regulations really is the right one”); Edward J.
Schnee & W. Eugene Seago, Deference Issues in the Tax Law, Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule—
Or Does It?, 96 J. TAX’N 366, 371–72 (2002) (proposing “less than Chevron deference” for
interpretive regulations).
114. See, e.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2008)
(expressly rejecting National Muffler in favor of Chevron review, reflecting a shift from pre-Mead
case law); McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100, 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2007) (identifying
Chevron as the standard of review but citing National Muffler as supporting deference to reasonable
regulations generally).
115. See, e.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 129–31 (2006), rev’d, 515 F.3d
162, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging “possibly subtle distinctions” between Chevron and
National Muffler, and applying National Muffler, but indicating that employing Chevron would not
yield a different result in the matter).
116. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
117. Id. at 710.
118. See Brief for Petitioners at 17-19, 36–44, Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 131 S.
Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 4111636 (applying National Muffler as part of Chevron analysis to
argue that the regulation is unreasonable); Brief for the United States at 50–53, Mayo Found. for
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issued just a few weeks ago, a unanimous Supreme Court expressly and
unequivocally rejected the continued vitality of National Muffler in favor of
Chevron review for general authority Treasury regulations and uniformity in
the application of administrative law principles.119
Undoubtedly, the resilience of National Muffler despite Chevron can be
attributed at least partly to the rational ignorance theory advanced by Levy
and Glicksman. Indeed, the motley state of the briefing in Supreme Court
tax cases from Boyle in 1985 to Boeing in 2003 is inexplicable without
admitting at least some role for attorney ignorance bred by the silo effect.
The absolute silence of many taxpayer briefs regarding the applicable
standard of review could also be interpreted as a strategic response to
doctrinal uncertainty. Regardless, at some point between Chevron and
Mayo—given the disagreement among several circuits that emerged in the
1990s, the widely-publicized ABA Task Force Report in 2004, a decade’s
worth of articles in law reviews and practitioner journals, plus attendant bar
association panels and discussions—rational ignorance ceased to be a
plausible explanation for National Muffler’s continued vitality.
For taxpayers, the strategic value of continuing to cite National Muffler
is obvious: the National Muffler standard was arguably less deferential
toward the government than Chevron review, thus offering taxpayers a better
chance of persuading courts to invalidate unfavorable Treasury regulations.
For the government, the strategic justification for citing National Muffler as
late as 1998 in Atlantic Mutual Insurance is less obvious. One might
theorize that government attorneys ought to have preferred the more
deferential Chevron standard and argued vigorously for courts to employ it
rather than National Muffler review. The government’s failure to do so
would seem to support the rational ignorance theory advanced by Levy and
Glicksman. At least before the Supreme Court, however, briefs were
prepared by the Office of the Solicitor General, which of course knew all
about the Chevron standard. Yet, as Thomas Merrill has explained, at least
in the late 1980s, that office was convinced of Chevron’s value to the

Med. Educ. & Research, 131 S. Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 3761871 (criticizing petitioners for
relying upon National Muffler instead of Chevron); Brief of Tax Professor Carlton M. Smith as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 2–3, Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 131
S. Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 3334503 (“urg[ing] the Court to clarify that the [National
Muffler] standard . . . remains the applicable standard for assessing . . . interpretive tax regulations,”
and “ask[ing] the Court to clarify that [the Chevron standard] is applicable to tax regulations only
when Congress specifically delegates to the Treasury Department regulatory authority regarding a
particular tax matter” (internal citations omitted)); Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E.
Hickman in Support of Respondent at 14–31, Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 131 S. Ct.
704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 3934618 (counseling the Court not to disregard the Chevron standard
in favor of National Muffler review in evaluating the validity of general authority Treasury
regulations and not to specially incorporate National Muffler factors into Chevron analysis in tax
cases).
119. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
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Executive Branch but uncertain of the precise parameters of Chevron’s scope
and doubtful of the Court’s commitment to the standard.120 Accordingly,
briefs filed by the government before the Supreme Court during that period
“tip-toe[d]” around Chevron issues to avoid provoking adverse precedents
that could limit Chevron’s applicability.121 Such a policy would explain the
government’s simultaneous citation of both Chevron and National Muffler in
Atlantic Mutual Insurance and in Cottage Savings. The Court’s subsequent
clarification of Chevron’s scope in Mead, in which the Court expressly
linked most instances of notice-and-comment rulemaking with Chevron
review, likewise explains the government’s more vehement claim to Chevron
deference in Boeing.
IV. Conclusion
The agency-specific precedent phenomenon that Levy and Glicksman
have identified is a real and meaningful problem for those interested in
preserving some uniformity in the application of administrative law
principles. To the extent that rational ignorance contributes to the difficulty,
educating practicing attorneys regarding general administrative law norms is
a worthwhile endeavor that may offer a partial solution.
Yet rational ignorance is only one likely cause of the agency-specific
precedent problem. Indeed, further examination of the tax examples that
Levy and Glicksman offer suggests that rational ignorance may not even be
the main contributor to the problem of agency-specific precedents in those
particular instances. Ongoing battles over the labeling of general authority
Treasury regulations, the applicability of APA notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements to those pronouncements, and the just-resolved
disagreement concerning the standard of review for general authority
Treasury regulations, offer substantial evidence that deliberate strategy
sometimes contributes to the problem of agency-specific precedents.
In some cases, educating practicing attorneys regarding general
administrative law norms may in fact perpetuate or even exacerbate rather
than alleviate the difficulty by enabling more attorneys to strategize when
and how to cite different precedents to their advantage rather than to help
courts identify and rationalize the divergences. Administrative law doctrine
includes many mushy and malleable standards.
Some degree of
differentiation, certainly case-by-case and likely agency-by-agency as well,
will be inevitable. With greater understanding of the options between
agency-specific precedents and administrative law norms, parties may simply
adjust their litigation strategies to avoid, hedge, or exploit minor variations

120. Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, 19 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS,
Winter 1994, at 1, 14.
121. Id.
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among judicial opinions to achieve their desired outcomes and to preserve
future arguments.
Unless and until litigants see a benefit to highlighting particular
deviations for judicial consideration, they likely will decline to do so. The
courts will always lack the resources to counteract such strategic behavior by
the parties before them. Hence, while I tip my hat to Levy and Glicksman’s
systematic identification of the problem, and agree that their proposals may
help in some cases, I fear that agency-specific precedents are here to stay.

